Cross-provincial collaborative transaction that considers both the green electricity and the green certificate markets under a renewable portfolio standard policy

被引:8
作者
Zhen, Juntao [1 ]
Zhao, Laijun [1 ]
Yi, Hongru [1 ]
Cheng, Youfeng [1 ]
Wang, Ke [1 ]
Hu, Haisheng [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Shanghai Sci & Technol, Business Sch, 334 Jungong Rd, Shanghai 200093, Peoples R China
关键词
Renewable portfolio standard; Green electricity market; Green certificate market; Cooperative game; ALLOCATION; SYSTEM;
D O I
10.1016/j.apenergy.2024.123787
中图分类号
TE [石油、天然气工业]; TK [能源与动力工程];
学科分类号
0807 ; 0820 ;
摘要
In the current implementation of the Renewable Portfolio Standard (RPS), various quota entities are facing challenges, including high costs and limited flexibility within a non -collaborative, single green certificate market mechanism. To address these issues, we developed a cross -provincial collaborative transaction model that considers both the green electricity and the green certificate markets. It consists of five sub -models: a green electricity production net revenue maximization sub -model, a green electricity consumption net benefit maximization sub -model, a green electricity and green certificate market categorization sub -model, a cooperative game sub -model for green electricity and green certificate buyers and sellers, and a cooperative benefits allocation sub -model. The roles of each province (i.e., green electricity and certificate buyers and sellers), along with the optimal green electricity generation, green certificate trading volume, and cost of achieving RPS objectives for each province, can be determined by utilizing the first four sub -models. Ultimately, the cooperative benefit allocation sub -model promotes cooperation among the provinces. To validate the model's effectiveness, we chose five representative provincial -level regions of China for empirical analysis. We found that the cooperative mode decreased the cost by 238.554 x 10 8 CNY (15.9%) compared with each province independently achieving RPS targets in a non -cooperative mode. Moreover, cooperation increased green electricity generation by 447.94 x 10 8 kWh (13.3%). The cooperative mode will therefore encourage provincial governments to formulate cooperative strategies for achieving RPS objectives, ultimately reducing implementation costs and increasing flexibility and effectiveness.
引用
收藏
页数:13
相关论文
共 43 条
[1]  
[Anonymous], 2022, Shandong Statistical Yearbook.
[2]  
[Anonymous], 2021, National average green certificate price
[3]  
[Anonymous], 2022, Shanxi Statistical Yearbook
[4]  
[Anonymous], 2021, EDITORIAL BOARD CHIN
[5]  
[Anonymous], 2022, Hebei Statistical Yearbook.
[6]  
[Anonymous], 2022, BEIJ STAT YB
[7]  
Beijing Municipal Commission of Development and Reform, 2015, Price of coal-fired power generation.
[8]   Power Market Equilibrium under the Joint FIP-RPS Renewable Energy Incentive Mechanism in China [J].
Cai, Hualin ;
Chen, Jiageng ;
Dong, Chenjing ;
Li, Jing ;
Lin, Zhemin ;
He, Chuan ;
Jiang, Yicheng ;
Li, Jincheng ;
Yang, Li .
SUSTAINABILITY, 2019, 11 (18)
[9]   Optimization of China's provincial renewable energy installation plan for the 13th five-year plan based on renewable portfolio standards [J].
Fan, Jing-Li ;
Wang, Jia-Xing ;
Hu, Jia-Wei ;
Wang, Yu ;
Zhang, Xian .
APPLIED ENERGY, 2019, 254
[10]  
Guangzhou Power Exchange Center, 2022, Green power trading rules (trial)