Central environmental protection inspection and carbon emission reduction: A tripartite evolutionary game model from the perspective of carbon neutrality

被引:26
作者
Zhang, Zhen-Hua [1 ,2 ]
Ling, Dan [3 ]
Yang, Qin-Xin [3 ]
Feng, Yan-Chao [4 ]
Xiu, Jing [5 ]
机构
[1] Lanzhou Univ, Sch Econ, Lanzhou 730000, Gansu, Peoples R China
[2] Lanzhou Univ, Inst Green Finance, Lanzhou 730000, Gansu, Peoples R China
[3] Lanzhou Univ, Sch Management, Lanzhou 730000, Gansu, Peoples R China
[4] Zhengzhou Univ, Sch Business, Zhengzhou 450001, Henan, Peoples R China
[5] Jilin Acad Social Sci, Inst Econ, Changchun 130033, Jilin, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Central environmental protection; inspection; Local government; Manufacturing enterprise; Tripartite evolutionary game; Carbon emission reduction; EMPIRICAL-ANALYSIS; CHINA; IMPLEMENTATION; STRATEGY; POLICY; ENTERPRISES; EFFICIENCY;
D O I
10.1016/j.petsci.2023.11.014
中图分类号
TE [石油、天然气工业]; TK [能源与动力工程];
学科分类号
0807 ; 0820 ;
摘要
Since the carbon neutrality target was proposed, many countries have been facing severe challenges to carbon emission reduction sustainably. This study is conducted using a tripartite evolutionary game model to explore the impact of the central environmental protection inspection (CEPI) on driving carbon emission reduction, and to study what factors influence the strategic choices of each party and how they interact with each other. The research results suggest that local governments and manufacturing enterprises would choose strategies that are beneficial to carbon reduction when CEPI increases. When the initial willingness of all parties increases 20%, 50%-80%, the time spent for the whole system to achieve stability decreases from 100%, 60%-30%. The evolutionary result of "thorough inspection, regulation implementation, low-carbon management" is the best strategy for the tripartite evolutionary game. Moreover, the smaller the cost and the larger the benefit, the greater the likelihood of the three-party game stability strategy appears. This study has important guiding significance for other developing countries to promote carbon emission reduction by environmental policy. (c) 2023 The Authors. Publishing services by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of KeAi Communications Co. Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/ 4.0/).
引用
收藏
页码:2139 / 2153
页数:15
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