How to promote carbon emission reduction in buildings? Evolutionary analysis of government regulation and financial investment

被引:4
|
作者
Wang, Wei [1 ]
Hao, Shaojie [1 ]
Zhong, Hua [2 ]
Sun, Zhi [3 ]
机构
[1] Yanshan Univ, Sch Civil Engn & Mech, Qinhuangdao 066000, Peoples R China
[2] London South Bank Univ, Sch Built Environm & Architecture, London SE1 0AA, England
[3] Minist Housing & Urban Rural Dev, Res Inst Stand & Norms, Beijing 10010, Peoples R China
来源
JOURNAL OF BUILDING ENGINEERING | 2024年 / 89卷
基金
英国自然环境研究理事会;
关键词
Carbon emission reduction; Government regulation; Construction enterprises; Market intervention; Evolutionary game; Numerical simulation; GREENHOUSE-GAS EMISSIONS; SUPPLY CHAIN; INNOVATION EVIDENCE; CO2; EMISSIONS; GAME-THEORY; ENERGY; INTERVENTION; STRATEGIES; MANUFACTURERS; OPTIMIZATION;
D O I
10.1016/j.jobe.2024.109279
中图分类号
TU [建筑科学];
学科分类号
0813 ;
摘要
Buildings account for a significant portion of global carbon emissions, necessitating strategies to accelerate decarbonisation in the construction sector. This research aims to analyse the behavioural strategies and interactions among governments, construction enterprises, and financial institutions in promoting building carbon emission reduction (CER) through an integrated regulatory and market-driven approach. A novel three-party evolutionary game model is developed that incorporates government regulation policies, the profit-driven nature of construction enterprises, and the investment incentives of financial institutions. Numerical simulations using MATLAB were performed to evaluate the dynamic replication and evolutionary stabilities of stakeholder strategies under different scenarios. Residential project M in Beijing was chosen as a realistic environment for simulation and analysis. The results demonstrate that stringent government regulation can incentivize financial institutions to increase their investments in CER initiatives. However, construction enterprises may still resist decarbonisation efforts if the costs outweigh the economic benefits. A two-pronged approach combining "command-and-control" regulation and "market-facilitation" interventions is proposed to effectively align stakeholder interests. This study provides valuable insights into leveraging both regulatory instruments and market-based incentives to drive the transition towards sustainable construction practises. Policy recommendations are offered to create an enabling environment that encourages the active participation of all stakeholders in achieving net-zero emission targets for buildings. The novelty lies in the development of an integrated tripartite evolutionary game framework that coherently captures the dynamics among regulators, industry players, and financial institutions, thus supporting low-carbon policymaking in the construction domain.
引用
收藏
页数:23
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