Literacy and Financial Education: Private Providers, Public Certification and Political Preferences

被引:3
作者
Guerini, Carolina [1 ]
Masciandaro, Donato [2 ,3 ,4 ]
Papini, Alessia [3 ]
机构
[1] Cattaneo Univ, LIUC & SDA Bocconi Univ, Milan, Italy
[2] Bocconi Univ, Dept Econ, Milan, Italy
[3] Bocconi Univ, Baffi Ctr, Milan, Italy
[4] SUERF, Milan, Italy
关键词
Financial education; Financial literacy; Political economy; Education marketing; Text analysis; European Parliament and ECB; D72; G28; G53; L15; M3; MONETARY-POLICY; CREDENCE GOODS; CENTRAL BANKER; TRUST; INFORMATION; CONTRACTS; INSTITUTIONS; INFLATION; SERVICES; RATINGS;
D O I
10.1007/s40797-024-00287-1
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Financial education can influence the level of financial literacy. In many countries public authorities implement financial education policy by means of ex ante certification of both private and public providers of education activities. This article uses political economy, educational marketing and text analysis as complementary tools to offer a positive analysis of such setting. Being financial education a credence good and given the key assumption that financial literacy is a country state-contingent endowment that deteriorates, as a consequence of innovation, the third-party certification can be considered as a strategic governance solution. Yet, when a public agency acts as third-party certifier, political and bureaucratic incentives shape its action. In particular, political activism in financial education can be motivated by financial instability worries. Such theoretical relationship is empirically confirmed applying text analyses, and using financial education narrative as a proxy for activism both for the politicians of the European Parliament and the bureaucrats of the ECB in the period 1997-2024.
引用
收藏
页码:463 / 514
页数:52
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