Representation and Forest Conservation: Evidence from India's Scheduled Areas

被引:5
作者
Gulzar, Saad [1 ,2 ]
Lal, Apoorva
Pasquale, Benjamin
机构
[1] Princeton Univ, Dept Polit, Princeton, NJ 08544 USA
[2] Princeton Univ, Sch Publ & Int Affairs, Princeton,, NJ 08544 USA
关键词
PROTECTED AREAS; DEFORESTATION; LAND; GOVERNANCE; COMMUNITY; DECENTRALIZATION; JHARKHAND;
D O I
10.1017/S0003055423000758
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
How does political representation affect conservation? We argue that the mixed evidence in the literature may be driven by institutional arrangements that provide authority to marginalized communities, but do not make adequate arrangements to truly boost their voice in resource management. We study a 1996 law that created local government councils with mandated representation for India's Scheduled Tribes (ST), a community of one hundred million. Using difference-in-differences designs, we find that the dramatic increase in ST representation led to a substantial increase in tree cover and a reduction in deforestation. We present suggestive evidence that representation enabled marginalized communities to better pursue their interests, which, unlike commercial operations such as mining, are compatible with forest conservation. While conservation policy tends to stress environmentally focused institutions, we suggest more attention be given to umbrella institutions, such as political representation, which can address conservation and development for marginalized communities in tandem.
引用
收藏
页码:764 / 783
页数:20
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