The Metaphysics of Concepts: Contemporary Approaches

被引:0
作者
Bulov, Ilya Y. [1 ]
机构
[1] Russian Acad Sci, Inst Philosophy, 12-1 Goncharnaya Str, Moscow 109240, Russia
关键词
concepts; mental representations; abilities; ontology of concepts; representationalism;
D O I
10.21146/0042-8744-2024-4-53-63
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
The article is an overview of the contemporary approaches to the metaphysics of concepts. We have attempted to show the complexity of the discussion about the metaphysics of concepts, as well as the diversity of modern philosophical positions on this issue. Representationalism and Fregeanism are still the most popular approaches to the metaphysics of concepts. In the first part we discuss the main ideas and possible drawbacks of the mainstream views - representationalism and Fregeanism. Representationalist view considers concepts as mental representations, whereas Fregeanism states that concepts are Fregean senses. In the second part we briefly discuss the less popular approaches: the mixed view, eliminativism and abilitism. According to the mixed view, concepts are mental representations typed in terms of the Frege's senses they express. Eliminativism is in favor of eliminating the term "concept". The abilitism supporters suppose that concepts are mental capacities.
引用
收藏
页码:53 / 63
页数:225
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