Quality control strategy of technology supply chain under considering manufacturer's R&D under differential licensing

被引：0
|
作者：
Li C. [1 ]
Zhang C. [1 ]
Wang X. [1 ]
机构：
[1] School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang
来源：
Jisuanji Jicheng Zhizao Xitong/Computer Integrated Manufacturing Systems, CIMS | 2023年 / 29卷 / 08期
基金：
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词：
architecture-level authorization; in-house research and development; kernel-level authorization; quality upgrade; technology-intensive supply chain;
D O I：
10.13196/j.cims.2023.08.028
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
Based on kernel-level licensing or architecture-level licensing of technology provider, the quality and price strategies of technology-intensive supply chain considering manufacturers' Research and Development (R&D) modes were constructed. Applying numerical examples, the impacts of competition intensity, quality cost coefficient and licensing fee on equilibrium results were analyzed. The applicability of different licensing models to the market and the boundary conditions of manufacturers' choice of core component outsourcing or in-house R&D models were explored. The results showed that the competition and quality upgrade could promote the quality investment of technology provider; however, the increase of quality cost would motivate manufacturers to shift from quality competition to price competition, resulting in the emergence of inferior products. When the strategic manufacturer's ability was weak, it was more profitable to adopt the outsourcing R&D; otherwise, the strategic manufacturer (M2) adopting in-house R&D could get more benefits. Under the asymmetric market structure, the two manufacturers had different strategic preferences when the licensing fee of M2 was lower. It was always better for the provider to choose the architecture-level authorization. © 2023 CIMS. All rights reserved.
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页码：2846 / 2861
页数：15
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