Communication on networks and strong reliability

被引：0
|
作者：
Laclau, Marie [1 ,2 ]
Renou, Ludovic [3 ,4 ]
Venel, Xavier [5 ]
机构：
[1] HEC Paris, 1 Rue Liberat, F-78351 Jouy En Josas, France
[2] GREGHEC CNRS, 1 Rue Liberat, F-78351 Jouy En Josas, France
[3] Queen Mary Univ London, London E1 4NS, England
[4] CEPR, London E1 4NS, England
[5] LUISS Guido Carli Univ, 32 Viale Romania, I-00197 Rome, Italy
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 2024年 / 217卷
关键词：
Cheap talk; Direct; Mediated; Communication; Protocol; Network; REPEATED GAMES; INFORMATION;
D O I：
10.1016/j.jet.2024.105822
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We consider sender-receiver games, where the sender and the receiver are two distant nodes in a communication network. We show that if the network has two disjoint paths of communication between the sender and the receiver, then we can replicate all equilibrium outcomes not only of the direct communication game (i.e., when the sender and the receiver communicate directly with each other) but also of the mediated game (i.e., when the sender and the receiver communicate with the help of a mediator).
引用
收藏
页数：19
相关论文
共 50 条
12345