Third-party mediation based bilateral multi-issue automated negotiation model

被引:0
|
作者
Qiao J. [1 ]
Sun N. [1 ]
Liu M. [1 ]
机构
[1] School of Management, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Automated negotiation model; Bilateral multi-issue; Fairness-first and efficiency-second; Third-party mediation;
D O I
10.12011/SETP2020-0944
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
A genetic algorithm based bilateral multi-issue automated negotiation model with a third-party mediator agent, a L-K type synchronous offer protocol, a fairness-first and efficiency-second evaluation criterion C5, as well as an elite, a preferential and a random offer choice method is proposed. The experimental results show that: The model can be used to obtain a win-win negotiation result under the condition of private information; C5 fully reflects the negotiation principle of fairness-first and efficiencysecond, and it is easy to find Nash solution that fully reflects the principle by using this criterion; L and K are the key factors that affect the negotiation result, when L and K are small but valued appropriately, the elite offer choice method is the best offer choice method; Increasing both L and K can improve the negotiation result, and they play a complementary role with each other; When L is large enough, the negotiation results will no longer be affected by other factors, and Nash equilibrium offer will be the unique closed offer. © 2022, Editorial Board of Journal of Systems Engineering Society of China. All right reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:1366 / 1377
页数:11
相关论文
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