A behavioural analysis of credulous Twitter users

被引：0

作者：

Balestrucci A. ^{[1
,2
]}

De Nicola R. ^{[2
,3
]}

Petrocchi M. ^{[2
,4
]}

Trubiani C. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Gran Sasso Science Institute, via M. Iacobucci 2, L'Aquila

[2] IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca, Piazza San Francesco 19, Lucca

[3] CINI Cybersecurity Lab, Via Ariosto, 25, Roma

[4] Istituto di Informatica e Telematica - CNR, Via G. Moruzzi 1, Pisa

来源：

Online Social Networks and Media | 2021年 / 23卷

基金：

欧盟地平线“2020”;

关键词：

Credulous users; Disinformation spreading; Features analysis; Online behavioural analysis; Twitter;

D O I：

10.1016/j.osnem.2021.100133

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

Thanks to platforms such as Twitter and Facebook, people can know facts and events that otherwise would have been silenced. However, social media significantly contribute also to fast spreading biased and false news while targeting specific segments of the population. We have seen how false information can be spread using automated accounts, known as bots. Using Twitter as a benchmark, we investigate behavioural attitudes of so called ‘credulous’ users, i.e., genuine accounts following many bots. Leveraging our previous work, where supervised learning is successfully applied to single out credulous users, we improve the classification task with a detailed features’ analysis and provide evidence that simple and lightweight features are crucial to detect such users. Furthermore, we study the differences in the way credulous and not credulous users interact with bots and discover that credulous users tend to amplify more the content posted by bots and argue that their detection can be instrumental to get useful information on possible dissemination of spam content, propaganda, and, in general, little or no reliable information. © 2021 Elsevier B.V.

引用

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