Reputation-based adaptive strategy persistence can promote cooperation considering the actual influence of individual behavior

被引:3
作者
Zhang, Huizhen [1 ,2 ,3 ]
An, Tianbo [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Wang, Jingrui [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Wang, Liu [1 ,2 ,3 ]
An, Jinjin [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Zhao, Jian [1 ,2 ,3 ]
Jin, Xing [3 ,4 ,5 ]
机构
[1] Changchun Univ, Changchun 130000, Peoples R China
[2] Changchun Univ, Key Lab Intelligent Rehabil & Barrier free Disable, Minist Educ, Changchun 130000, Peoples R China
[3] Jilin Prov Key Lab Human Hlth Status Identificatio, Changchun 130000, Peoples R China
[4] Hangzhou Dianzi Univ, Sch Cyberspace, Hangzhou 310018, Peoples R China
[5] Hangzhou Dianzi Univ, Expt Ctr Data Sci & Intelligent Decis Making, Hangzhou 310018, Peoples R China
关键词
Evolutionary games; Strategy persistence; Reputation; Cooperation; PUBLIC-GOODS GAMES; INDIRECT RECIPROCITY; PRISONERS-DILEMMA; EVOLUTION; EMERGENCE;
D O I
10.1016/j.physleta.2024.129495
中图分类号
O4 [物理学];
学科分类号
0702 ;
摘要
Reputation mechanisms have proved to play a crucial role in promoting cooperation. In some previous studies, reputation updates only considered an individual's past behavior or the environment in which the individual is located. In fact, an individual's reputation depends not only on past behaviors, but also on the actual impact of his/her behavior on society. Motivated by these facts, we introduce strategy persistence in the spatial Prisoner's Dilemma to explore the actual impact of individual behavior on society. Specifically, it is determined whether behavior has an actual impact on society by comparing the average payoffs of an individual and his/her community. Experiments show that our model significantly promotes cooperation. The proportion of population cooperation shows a nonlinear evolution, eventually converges to the oscillatory state. Interestingly, we find that some low -reputation individuals and high -reputation cooperators always change strategies. Finally, we verify the accuracy of the results by applying the mean -field approach.
引用
收藏
页数:9
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