Who can see it coming? Demand-side selection in long-term care insurance related to decision-making abilities

被引:0
作者
Lambregts, Timo R. [1 ,2 ]
Schut, Frederik T. [1 ]
机构
[1] Erasmus Sch Hlth Policy & Management, Rotterdam, Netherlands
[2] Erasmus Sch Hlth Policy & Management, Burgemeester Oudlaan 50, NL-3062 PA Rotterdam, Netherlands
关键词
adverse selection; education; long-term care insurance; numeracy; private information; ADVANTAGEOUS SELECTION; MORAL HAZARD; ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION; PRIVATE INFORMATION; ADVERSE SELECTION; MARKETS; RISK; HEALTH; HETEROGENEITY; PROBABILITIES;
D O I
10.1111/jori.12465
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Despite the growing demand for long-term care (LTC), the uptake of private LTC insurance (LTCI) is low and even declining in the United States. One reason is the complexity of LTCI decisions. Researchers have therefore suggested to support decision-making abilities. This paper shows, however, that such support would not unambiguously enhance functioning of the LTCI market. We analyze whether selection arises from two correlated but different decision-making abilities at old age, education and numeracy, and interactions thereof with private information. Using historical data from the Health and Retirement Survey we find that education generates adverse selection, which is only partially offset by advantageous selection due to numeracy. In addition, individuals with greater decision-making abilities make better LTCI choices, amplifying selection by education and numeracy. This points at a trade-off between decision simplicity and selection in insurance markets and suggests other steps are needed to enhance the performance of private LTCI markets.
引用
收藏
页码:697 / 719
页数:23
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