Political freedom and financial inclusion: Unraveling social trust and political rent-seeking

被引:3
作者
Ma, Yechi [1 ]
Ding, Yibing [2 ]
Bu, Ziwen [3 ]
Li, Suyang [4 ]
机构
[1] Northeast Normal Univ, Sch Business, Changchun 130024, Peoples R China
[2] Jilin Univ, Sch Econ, Changchun 130012, Peoples R China
[3] Univ Birmingham, Birmingham Business Sch, Birmingham B15 2TT, England
[4] Swansea Univ, Sch Management, Swansea SA1 8EN, Wales
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
Financial inclusion; Government policy and regulation; Political institution; Political right; GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP; CORRUPTION; SERVICES; BANKING; SAVINGS; ACCESS; RISK; INSTITUTIONS; IMPACT; MONEY;
D O I
10.1016/j.jebo.2024.01.024
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper delves into the role of political rights in shaping financial inclusion. Despite the acknowledged significance of political institutions in influencing financial systems, there remains limited understanding of the economic origins of the impact of political institutions on financial inclusion. Utilizing data from the 2021 Global Findex database, the study finds that weak political rights significantly reduce the likelihood of individuals possessing financial accounts and using digital financial services. Robustness tests employing an instrumental variable and the differencein-differences framework confirm that inadequate political rights have a detrimental effect on financial inclusion. By exploring the reasons for financial exclusion and moderating factors, this study provides supportive evidence for the mechanisms of eroded social trust and political rent-seeking as the key constraints that hinder inclusiveness in providing mainstream financial products and services.
引用
收藏
页码:46 / 65
页数:20
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