Short-term success and long-term failure? The case of GDP growth targets and corporate innovation

被引:3
|
作者
Sun, Yanyang [1 ]
Chen, Yu [2 ]
Wu, Wenruo [3 ]
机构
[1] Guangdong Univ Finance & Econ, Inst Capital Market & Audit Governance Studies, Guangdong Hong Kong Macao Greater Bay Area, 21 Luntou Rd, Guangzhou 510320, Guangdong, Peoples R China
[2] Shanghai Jiao Tong Univ, Antai Coll Econ & Management, 1954 Huashan Rd, Shanghai 200030, Peoples R China
[3] Shanghai Int Studies Univ, Sch Business Management, 1550 Wenxiang Rd, Shanghai 201620, Peoples R China
基金
中国国家自然科学基金;
关键词
GDP growth target; Corporate innovation; Cadre promotion; Government intervention; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-RIGHTS; EARNINGS MANAGEMENT EVIDENCE; ECONOMIC-GROWTH; POLITICAL CONNECTIONS; CHINA; PERFORMANCE; GOVERNMENT; DECENTRALIZATION; INSTITUTIONS; INCENTIVES;
D O I
10.1016/j.pacfin.2024.102308
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Excessive focus on achieving short -term economic success in China may risk its long-term prosperity. Using a large sample of Chinese listed firms, we find that a higher GDP growth target suppresses corporate innovation, and the relationship is more pronounced in less developed areas. We also find that local governments affect corporate innovation through both direct and indirect mechanisms. The direct mechanism shows that firms that are more subject to government intervention (e.g., large firms, SOEs, and grantees of government subsidies) exhibit a more negative relation between GDP growth targets and corporate innovation. The local government also strategically changes its fiscal spending, creating an environment that indirectly affects corporate innovation. Our results are robust to various robustness checks. Further analysis reveals that the negative effect of GDP growth targets on corporate innovation is exacerbated in less developed areas and that a reduction in R&D does not lead to less purchase from suppliers or less employee compensation. This study sheds light on a real effect of regional GDP growth targets based on the unique Chinese political-economic setting.
引用
收藏
页数:19
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