Madhyamaka and Ontic Structural Realism

被引:0
作者
Friend T. [1 ]
机构
[1] Department of Philosophy, Freie Universität Berlin, Habelschwerdter Allee 30, Berlin
来源
Asian Journal of Philosophy | / 3卷 / 1期
基金
欧洲研究理事会; 欧盟地平线“2020”;
关键词
Causation; Metaphysics; Mūlamadhyamakakārikā; Ontic Structural Realism;
D O I
10.1007/s44204-024-00146-x
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
I’ll argue that one particular argument of Nāgārjuna’s against causation in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā deserves careful consideration from the perspective of contemporary western metaphysics. To show why this is the case, I’ll offer an interpretation of the key passages which differs from at least one popular reading. I’ll then aim to show that a whole swathe of metaphysical views about causation are problematic in light of Nāgārjuna’s argument, so interpreted. I’ll conclude, however, that one contemporary view in metaphysics has the means to respond to this argument: Ontic Structural Realism. © The Author(s) 2024.
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