DoS-Resilient Load Frequency Control of Multi-Area Power Systems: An Attack-Parameter-Dependent Approach

This paper is concerned with a resilient load frequency control (LFC) of multi-area power systems subject to unknown load disturbances and intermittent denial-of-service (DoS) attacks. The central aim is to develop a feasible and less conservative DoS-resilient LFC scheme that constrains jammer's actions as less as possible and explores available attack information as much as possible in desired analysis and design criteria. Towards this aim, we first present a partially known DoS model that bounds merely the DoS-on durations. We then elaborate a sampled-data-based transmission paradigm which characterizes explicitly the uniform sampling instants and intermittent DoS-on and -off instants as well as the nonuniform arriving instants of the transmitted system data. Furthermore, we develop a novel attack-parameter-dependent Lyapunov functional to establish less conservative conditions for both stability analysis and controller design. It is shown that the exponential stability of the resultant closed-loop LFC system can be guaranteed, while also preserving both the desired minimum sleeping rate of DoS attacks and the prescribed H-infinity performance index against changing load disturbances. Finally, several case studies of a three-area power system are provided to verify the effectiveness and superiority of the derived theoretical results.