Risk compensation mechanism of rail transit PPP project under the mode of Two Bids Merged into One Bid

The design of risk aversion mechanism for urban rail transit PPP project under the mode of two bids merged into one bid was studied. In consideration of multiple information asymmetry, the risk aversion mechanism was designed by improving the performance appraisal system. Then, the principal-agent model of government and construction enterprises was established, and the genetic algorithm was used to optimize the calculation to get the best performance evaluation coefficient of government. Combined with an example, this paper used the method of binary tree and Monte Carlo simulation to study the influence of the inaccurate passenger flow forecast and the risk of construction cost overrun on the decision-making and income of all parties. The results show that the risk management model can effectively reduce the risk loss of all participants, and provide a new research idea for the risk management of urban rail transit PPP project. © 2020, Central South University Press. All rights reserved.