Resiliency-Driven Cyber-Physical Risk Assessment and Investment Planning for Power Substations

被引:6
作者
Khanna, Kush [1 ]
Govindarasu, Manimaran [2 ]
机构
[1] Hitachi Energy, Santa Clara, CA 95054 USA
[2] Iowa State Univ Sci & Technol, Elect & Comp Engn Dept, Ames, IA 50011 USA
关键词
Investment; Substations; Computer security; Power systems; Risk management; Resilience; Reliability; Cybersecurity; power system planning; resiliency; risk assessment; DATA INJECTION ATTACKS; STRATEGIES; PROTECTION;
D O I
10.1109/TCST.2024.3378990
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
As energy systems move into the larger domains of cyber-physical systems (CPSs), cyber threats on energy system infrastructure are likely to increase. Cybersecurity strategies must be evaluated and analyzed regularly to establish and maintain cyber resilience in CPS. With increased physical and cyber assaults on electrical grid power substations, it is critical to prioritize expenditures to enhance operational CPS resilience. An integrated cyber-physical paradigm for power system risk analysis and investment planning for power substations is presented in this article. To address and effectively manage cyber-physical risks, the proposed approach integrates power system resilience with cyber vulnerabilities capturing the maturity indicator level (MIL) concept. The defense strategies are analyzed for various attack scenarios using defender-attacker interactions. The defender's strategies for no-information, full-information, and partial-information defender-attacker interactions are compared to obtain the best possible investment strategy for minimizing the overall risk. The presented framework is simulated and validated for PJM five-bus and IEEE 39 bus systems.
引用
收藏
页码:1743 / 1754
页数:12
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