Nash Equilibria in Two-Resource Congestion Games with Player-Specific Payoff Functions

被引：1

作者：

Khanchouche, Fatima ^{[1
]}

Sbabou, Samir ^{[2
]}

Smaoui, Hatem ^{[3
]}

Ziad, Abderrahmane ^{[4
,5
]}

机构：

[1] Ferhat Abbas Univ Setif 1, Fac Sci, Dept Math, Fundamental & Numer Math Lab, Setif 19137, Algeria

[2] Univ Caen, Ctr Res Econ & Management, Esplanade Paix, F-14000 Caen, France

[3] Univ Reunion, Ctr Econ & Management Indian Ocean, 15 Ave Rene Cassin,BP 7115, F-97715 St Denis 9, France

[4] NU Normandie Univ, UNICAEN Univ Caen Normandie, CREM Ctr Rech Econ & Management, F-14000 Caen, France

[5] Ferhat Abbas Univ Setif 1, Lab Math Appl LaMA, Setif 19137, Algeria

来源：

GAMES | 2024年 / 15卷 / 02期

关键词：

game theory; Nash equilibria; congestion games; price of anarchy;

D O I：

10.3390/g15020007

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper, we examine the class of congestion games with player-specific payoff functions introduced by Milchtaich, I. (1996). Focusing on the special case of two resources, we give a short and simple method for identifying all Nash equilibria in pure strategies. We also provide a computation algorithm based on our theoretical analysis.

引用

页数：10

共 24 条

[1] Pure Nash equilibria in player-specific and weighted congestion games [J].

Ackermann, Heiner ;

Roeglin, Heiko ;

Voecking, Berthold .

THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE, 2009, 410 (17) :1552-1563

[2] On the Impact of Combinatorial Structure on Congestion Games [J].

Ackermann, Heiner ;

Roegln, Heiko ;

Voecking, Berthold .

JOURNAL OF THE ACM, 2008, 55 (06)

[3] THE PRICE OF STABILITY FOR NETWORK DESIGN WITH FAIR COST ALLOCATION [J].

Anshelevich, Elliot ;

Dasgupta, Anirban ;

Kleinberg, Jon ;

Tardos, Eva ;

Wexler, Tom ;

Roughgarden, Tim .

SIAM JOURNAL ON COMPUTING, 2008, 38 (04) :1602-1623

[4] Ordinal games and generalized Nash and Stackelberg solutions [J].

Cruz, JB ;

Simaan, MA .

JOURNAL OF OPTIMIZATION THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, 2000, 107 (02) :205-222

[5] ORDINAL GAMES [J].

Durieu, Jacques ;

Haller, Hans ;

Querou, Nicolas ;

Solal, Philippe .

INTERNATIONAL GAME THEORY REVIEW, 2008, 10 (02) :177-194

[6]

Fabrikant A., 2004, PROC 36 ACM S THEORY, P604, DOI [10.1145/1007352.1007445, DOI 10.1145/1007352.1007445]

[7] Selfish unsplittable flows [J].

Fotakis, D ;

Kontogiannis, S ;

Spirakis, P .

THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE, 2005, 348 (2-3) :226-239

[8] The structure and complexity of Nash equilibria for a selfish routing game [J].

Fotakis, Dimitris ;

Kontogiannis, Spyros ;

Koutsoupias, Elias ;

Mavronicolas, Marios ;

Spirakis, Paul .

THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE, 2009, 410 (36) :3305-3326

[9] Strong equilibrium in network congestion games: increasing versus decreasing costs [J].

Holzman, Ron ;

Monderer, Dov .

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY, 2015, 44 (03) :647-666

[10]

Ieong S., 2005, PROC 20 NATL C ARTIF, P489

← 1 2 3 →