Online trade platforms: Hosting, selling, or both?

被引：7

作者：

Anderson S. ^{[1
,3
]}

Bedre-Defolie Ö. ^{[2
,3
]}

机构：

[1] University of Virginia, Department of Economics, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, 22904-4182, VA

[2] ESMT Berlin, Schlossplatz 1, Berlin

[3] CEPR Centre for Economic Policy Research, 33 Great Sutton Street, London

来源：

International Journal of Industrial Organization | 2022年 / 84卷

基金：

欧洲研究理事会; 欧盟地平线“2020”;

关键词：

Hybrid business model; Regulation; Steering; Trade platform;

D O I：

10.1016/j.ijindorg.2022.102861

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

We illustrate conditions under which a trade platform selling its own products alongside third-party sellers benefits or harms consumers. This benefits consumers by lowering prices in a suite of models: a gatekeeper platform facing a competitive fringe of sellers, when fringe sellers also have their own channels perfectly or imperfectly substitutable to the platform; when the gatekeeper platform with fringe sellers competes against a big seller with market power on a differentiated alternative channel; and when the gatekeeper platform hosts only a big seller with market power. Platform product entry might harm consumers when a big firm sells both on the platform and on its alternative channel. The platform selling its own products harms consumers when consumers have heterogenous tastes for variants of products and the platform can control the access of fringe sellers via its commission and own product price. We also review the recent literature to highlight other channels via which benefits and harm arise from the platform selling its own products in its marketplace. © 2022

引用

共 34 条

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