Burden Sharing and Self-Enforcing Climate Agreements

被引:0
|
作者
Ohori, Shuichi [1 ]
Ohta, Katsunori [1 ]
机构
[1] Kansai Univ, Fac Informat, 2-1-1Ryozenji Cho, Takatsuki, Osaka 5691095, Japan
基金
日本学术振兴会;
关键词
F53; Q54; Q56; climate agreements; emission quotas; equity; technology investments; repeated games; INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS; FULL PARTICIPATION; EMISSIONS; COOPERATION; ALLOCATION; EQUITY; GAME;
D O I
10.1086/727808
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This study analyzes self-enforcing climate agreements in a repeated-game framework in which asymmetric countries emit greenhouse gases over time. In particular, we consider a novel burden-sharing scheme that makes an agreement self-enforcing even when a relatively less patient country participates in the agreement. The long-term stable emission quota that makes the agreement self-enforcing for the largest set of discount factors equalizes the compliance thresholds across countries. We then show that the long-term stable quota satisfies grandfathering as an equity criterion when countries are asymmetric. This implies that low-emitting countries that have developed clean technologies will be reluctant to agree to the scheme, while countries that have invested in adaptation and brown technology are likely to accept the emission quota. Furthermore, an ambitious target level deteriorates the compliance incentives of countries that are allowed to have low emission reduction rates.
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页码:827 / 852
页数:26
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