ICPS false injection attack defense strategy based on multi-channel game

被引：0
|
作者：
Sun Z.-W. [1 ,2 ]
Hong T. [1 ]
机构：
[1] School of Internet of Things Engineering, Jiangnan University, Wuxi
[2] Engineering Research Center of Internet of Things Technology Applications of Ministry of Education, Wuxi
来源：
Kongzhi yu Juece/Control and Decision | 2022年 / 37卷 / 05期
关键词：
Data injection attacks; ICPS; Minimax controller; Multi-channel transmission; Zero-sum game;
D O I：
10.13195/j.kzyjc.2020.1738
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
The industrial cyber-physical system (ICPS) is increasingly connected to the infrastructure, meanwhile its communication network is vulnerable to environmental interference and false data injection attacks. Therefore, this paper studies a multi-channel transmission framework and a minimax controller to improve the elasticity of the ICPS under attack, environment interference and noise interference. The minimax controller is designed to enhance the elasticity of the ICPS under noise and interference. Furthermore, based on the multi-channel transmission framework, an attack-defense game model between the transmitter and the attacker is established, which uses the attack-defense game strategy to realize the elastic defense strategy of the whole ICPS. Through the joint debugging simulation of OPNET and Matlab, the performance of the ICPS control system based on the multi-channel transmission framework under data injection attacks is simulated. The simulation results show that the elastic defense strategy composed of the minimax controller and the multi-channel transmission framework can not only improve the stability of the system under environmental interference, but also reduce the impact of data injection attacks on the ICPS effectively. Copyright ©2022 Control and Decision.
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页码：1357 / 1366
页数：9
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