Truthful double auction based incentive mechanism for participatory sensing systems

被引:0
作者
Middya, Asif Iqbal [1 ]
Roy, Sarbani [1 ]
机构
[1] Jadavpur Univ, Dept Comp Sci & Engn, Kolkata, India
关键词
Participatory sensing; Double auction; Task allocation; Incentive mechanism; MOBILE; DESIGN; POLLUTION; QUALITY;
D O I
10.1007/s12083-024-01681-3
中图分类号
TP [自动化技术、计算机技术];
学科分类号
0812 ;
摘要
The sensors available in the smartphones are useful to explore a diverse range of city dynamics (e.g. noise pollution, road condition, traffic condition, etc.). The potential of the smartphone sensors coupled with their widespread availability help to emerge a new paradigm of sensing known as participatory sensing. It uses the power of smartphone equipped sensors to collect, store, and analyze data with high spatiotemporal granularity. In a participatory sensing based system, a task provider (also known as a crowdsourcer) may have a set of sensing tasks regarding different dynamics of a city. Here, adequate users' participation is necessary to acquire a sufficient amount of data which is a key factor for the participatory sensing based systems to provide good service quality. The task providers appoint a set of task executors (smartphone users i.e. participants of crowdsensing tasks) to execute those sensing tasks. But, existing works on sensing task allocation suffer from lack of good incentive mechanisms that are attractive for the task executors. In order to address this issue, in this paper, a double auction based incentive mechanism called TATA (Truthful Double Auction for Task Allocation) is proposed for participatory sensing. TATA performs fair allocation of tasks which is leading to efficient incentive mechanism. In the case of TATA, the fair allocation of sensing tasks of the task providers to the task executers indicates that the proposed double auction mechanism is able to satisfy the truthfulness property in order to resist market manipulation (i.e., untruthful bidding and asking). Specifically, TATA achieves all the desirable properties like individual rationality, truthfulness (i.e. incentive compatibility), budget balance, etc. TATA is also computationally efficient and yields high system efficiency. Additionally, the performance of the proposed incentive mechanism is evaluated and compared with the existing mechanisms through extensive simulations based on the real-world data from Amazon Mechanical Turk. TATA yields high utility and satisfaction for the task providers and executors as compared to the existing mechanisms.
引用
收藏
页码:2137 / 2166
页数:30
相关论文
共 78 条
  • [1] LiSense: Monitoring City Street Lighting during Night using Smartphone Sensors
    Alam, M. Yusuf
    Imam, Md Shahrukh
    Anurag, Harshit
    Saha, Sujoy
    Nandi, Subrata
    Saha, Mousumi
    [J]. 2018 18TH IEEE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON DATA MINING WORKSHOPS (ICDMW), 2018, : 596 - 603
  • [2] RoadSense: Smartphone Application to Estimate Road Conditions Using Accelerometer and Gyroscope
    Allouch, Azza
    Koubaa, Anis
    Abbes, Tarek
    Ammar, Adel
    [J]. IEEE SENSORS JOURNAL, 2017, 17 (13) : 4231 - 4238
  • [3] Personal pollution monitoring: mobile real-time air quality in daily life
    Bales, Elizabeth
    Nikzad, Nima
    Quick, Nichole
    Ziftci, Celal
    Patrick, Kevin
    Griswold, William G.
    [J]. PERSONAL AND UBIQUITOUS COMPUTING, 2019, 23 (02) : 309 - 328
  • [4] Bose B, 2018, 2018 3 INT C INT THI, DOI [DOI 10.1109/IOT-SIU.2018.8519861, 10.1109/iot-siu.2018.8519861]
  • [5] Truthful incentive mechanisms for mobile crowd sensing with dynamic smartphones
    Cai, Hui
    Zhu, Yanmin
    Feng, Zhenni
    Zhu, Hongzi
    Yu, Jiadi
    Cao, Jian
    [J]. COMPUTER NETWORKS, 2018, 141 : 1 - 16
  • [6] Chandra Baidik, 2021, Emerging Technologies in Data Mining and Information Security. Proceedings of IEMIS 2020. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing (AISC 1286), P597, DOI 10.1007/978-981-15-9927-9_58
  • [7] SPARC: Strategy-Proof Double Auction for Mobile Participatory Sensing
    Chen, Cai
    Wang, Yinglin
    [J]. 2013 INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON CLOUD COMPUTING AND BIG DATA (CLOUDCOM-ASIA), 2013, : 133 - 140
  • [8] A truthful double auction for two-sided heterogeneous mobile crowdsensing markets
    Chen, Shuang
    Liu, Min
    Chen, Xiao
    [J]. COMPUTER COMMUNICATIONS, 2016, 81 : 31 - 42
  • [9] Timeliness-Aware Incentive Mechanism for Vehicular Crowdsourcing in Smart Cities
    Chen, Xianhao
    Zhang, Lan
    Pang, Yawei
    Lin, Bin
    Fang, Yuguang
    [J]. IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE COMPUTING, 2022, 21 (09) : 3373 - 3387
  • [10] Chou CT, 2007, P POSTER PAPERS, P13