OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION

被引:432
作者
HARRIS, M
RAVIV, A
机构
[1] Graduate School of Industrial Administration, Carnegie-Mellon University, Pittsburgh
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0022-0531(79)90073-5
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
[No abstract available]
引用
收藏
页码:231 / 259
页数:29
相关论文
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