AGENCY BUDGETS, COST INFORMATION, AND AUDITING

被引：64
作者：
BANKS, JS
机构：
来源：
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE | 1989年 / 33卷 / 03期
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/2111068
中图分类号：
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号：
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：670 / 699
页数：30
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