THE MULTIPERIOD PRINCIPAL AGENT PROBLEM

[1] REPEATED PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIPS WITH LENDING AND BORROWING [J]. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 1985, 17 (1-2) : 27 - 31

[2] PLANNING UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AND THE RATCHET EFFECT [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1985, 52 (02) : 173 - 191

[3] FUDENBERG D, 1987, SHORT TERM CONTRACTS

[4] AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1983, 51 (01) : 7 - 45

[5] LAFFONT JJ, 1985, MIT397 WORK PAP

[6] LONG-TERM-CONTRACTS AND MORAL HAZARD [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 14 (02): : 441 - 452

[7] Mirrlees J., 1974, ESSAYS EC BEHAV UNCE, P243

[8] Mirrlees J, 1975, THEORY MORAL HAZAR 1

[9] Mirrlees J. A., 1979, IMPLICATIONS MORAL H

[10] REPEATED PRINCIPAL-AGENT GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1985, 53 (05) : 1173 - 1198

[1] REPEATED PRINCIPAL-AGENT RELATIONSHIPS WITH LENDING AND BORROWING [J]. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 1985, 17 (1-2) : 27 - 31

[2] PLANNING UNDER INCOMPLETE INFORMATION AND THE RATCHET EFFECT [J]. REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1985, 52 (02) : 173 - 191

[3] FUDENBERG D, 1987, SHORT TERM CONTRACTS

[4] AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1983, 51 (01) : 7 - 45

[5] LAFFONT JJ, 1985, MIT397 WORK PAP

[6] LONG-TERM-CONTRACTS AND MORAL HAZARD [J]. BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 14 (02): : 441 - 452

[7] Mirrlees J., 1974, ESSAYS EC BEHAV UNCE, P243

[8] Mirrlees J, 1975, THEORY MORAL HAZAR 1

[9] Mirrlees J. A., 1979, IMPLICATIONS MORAL H

[10] REPEATED PRINCIPAL-AGENT GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING [J]. ECONOMETRICA, 1985, 53 (05) : 1173 - 1198