THE MULTIPERIOD PRINCIPAL AGENT PROBLEM

被引：59

作者：

MALCOMSON, JM ^{[1
]}

SPINNEWYN, F ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] CATHOLIC UNIV LEUVEN,B-3000 LOUVAIN,BELGIUM

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES | 1988年 / 55卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2297391

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：391 / 407

页数：17

共 17 条

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ALLEN, F .

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GUESNERIE, R ;

TIROLE, J .

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES, 1985, 52 (02) :173-191

[3]

FUDENBERG D, 1987, SHORT TERM CONTRACTS

[4] AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM [J].

GROSSMAN, SJ ;

HART, OD .

ECONOMETRICA, 1983, 51 (01) :7-45

[5]

LAFFONT JJ, 1985, MIT397 WORK PAP

[6] LONG-TERM-CONTRACTS AND MORAL HAZARD [J].

LAMBERT, RA .

BELL JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 14 (02) :441-452

[7]

Mirrlees J., 1974, ESSAYS EC BEHAV UNCE, P243

[8]

Mirrlees J, 1975, THEORY MORAL HAZAR 1

[9]

Mirrlees J. A., 1979, IMPLICATIONS MORAL H

[10] REPEATED PRINCIPAL-AGENT GAMES WITH DISCOUNTING [J].

RADNER, R .

ECONOMETRICA, 1985, 53 (05) :1173-1198

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