STRATEGICALLY STABLE EQUILIBRIA IN GAMES WITH INFINITELY MANY PURE STRATEGIES

被引：20

作者：

ALNAJJAR, N

机构：

[1] Département des Sciences Économiques, Université du Québec à Montréal, P.O. Box 8888, Station A, Montreal, Quebec

来源：

MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES | 1995年 / 29卷 / 02期

关键词：

STRATEGIC STABILITY; PERFECT EQUILIBRIA; FORWARD INDUCTION;

D O I：

10.1016/0165-4896(94)00765-Z

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper studies the notion of Strategic Stability (Kohlberg and Mertens (Econometrica, 1986, 54, 1003-1039)) in games with compact metric spaces of pure strategies and continuous payoff functions. It is shown that stable sets exist and satisfy versions of the properties of admissibility, forward induction and elimination of dominated strategies.

引用

页码：151 / 164

页数：14