The New Governance Approach to the Devolution of Corporate Governance

被引：4

作者：

Rahim, Mia ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Macquarie Univ, Macquarie Law Sch, N Ryde, NSW, Australia

来源：

COMPETITION & CHANGE | 2012年 / 16卷 / 04期

关键词：

Corporate governance; new governance; shareholder primacy; enlightened shareholder primacy; corporate social responsibility;

D O I：

10.1179/1024529412Z.00000000021

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

The moral arguments associated with justice, fairness and communitarianism have rejected the exclusivity of cost-benefit analysis in corporate governance. Particularly, the percepts of new governance (NG) have included distributive aspects in efficiency models focused on maximizing profits. While corporate directors were only assigned to look after the return of investment within the traditional framework of corporate governance (CG), NG has created the scope for them to look beyond the set of contractual liabilities. This article explores how and how far NG notions have contributed to the devolution of CG to create internal strategies focusing on actors, ethics and accountability in corporate self-regulation.

引用

页码：343 / 352

页数：10

共 62 条

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