IS PERFECT INFORMATION PERFECTLY USELESS

被引：0

作者：

KING, SP

机构：

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1992年 / 39卷 / 04期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(92)90178-2

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

We show that, in a market for state contingent goods, a perfectly informed trader cannot trade to an ex post preferred allocation for a broad family of 'voluntary' trading mechanisms.

引用

页码：415 / 418

页数：4

共 6 条

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