Bringing Pyongyang into compliance with the NPT and its other nuclear obligations and keeping it there will require a persistent display of resolve by the international community, including strong leadership by the United States and the Republic of Korea. Both a sound legal architecture and major political change in the North must be achieved and sustained. The bilateral October 1994 US-North Korean agreement was intended to support both of these goals, but it contains within its structure and history elements which may work at cross purposes. Even if ultimately it helps resolve the Korean conflict satisfactorily, the impact of the October 1994 agreement elsewhere around the globe may complicate nuclear nonproliferation more than it helps. These negative effects can be reduced, however, and positive aspects of the agreement enhanced if the international community takes steps to strengthen the content of the anti-proliferation efforts now centered around the NPT and the dialogue between North and South Korea. That the necessary resolve will be displayed is not obvious. Given the political divisions within the world's democracies over the specifics of nonproliferation policies, the resurgence of the North-South dispute in the context of the NPT extension, and the spread of nuclear capability to nations less onerous or isolated than the DPRK, the international community's commitment to strong nonproliferation policies is not certain. Furthermore, success in dealing with North Korea's nuclear program is only a necessary, but not sufficient component of a successful global nonproliferation effort. The ultimate impact of the October 1994 US-DPRK agreement, like the final resolution of the Korean nuclear question, will not be seen for some time. Much will depend on how this agreement and that process are perceived and how they are implemented. Most importantly, success will be driven by attention to larger security, legal, political and economic considerations. One can imagine a very negative outcome if the consequences of the new agreement are to subsidize a totalitarian DPRK while failing to bring about significant political change, to undercut Seoul and/or the IAEA on inspections while failing to bring commensurate openness to the North, to call into question UN Security Council resolve on nonproliferation matters while encouraging other nations to pursue nuclear programs in order to extract concessions, to elevate Pyongyang's saber rattling to a rationale for concluding an agreement while leaving unresolved during a dangerous period of transition the question of North Korea's nuclear capability, etc. At the same time, if we do not forget these fundamental considerations, a positive outcome remains within reach. If a subsidized North Korean nuclear program does facilitate the end of dictatorship or the beginning of peaceful reunification it will enhance democracy and human rights to distant parts of the globe. If this disconcerting effort to ease Pyongyang out of its nuclear arms quest can be translated into a stronger nonproliferation regime worldwide, the risk from weapons of mass destruction may be greatly reduced. If the lession for the UN Security Council is that it must act sooner and with greater decisiveness toward threats to international security, and if it does peace will spread. Throughout all of this, the United States and the Republic of Korea, along with other friendly nations, must maintain the closest consultations to insure that this dangerous period of transition is navigated safely.
