OPTIMAL MANAGERIAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS AND THE VALUE OF CORPORATE INSURANCE

被引：31

作者：

CAMPBELL, TS ^{[1
]}

KRACAW, WA ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] PURDUE UNIV,KRANNERT SCH MANAGEMENT,W LAFAYETTE,IN 47907

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS | 1987年 / 22卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2330966

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：315 / 328

页数：14

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