TARP's deadbeat banks

被引：8

作者：

Wilson, Linus ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Louisiana Lafayette, B I Moody Coll Business 3, Dept Econ & Finance, 214 Hebrard Blvd,Moody Hall 253,POB 44570, Lafayette, LA 70504 USA

来源：

REVIEW OF QUANTITATIVE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING | 2013年 / 41卷 / 04期

关键词：

Bailout; Banking; Capital Purchase Program; Dividends; Emergency Economic Stabilization Act; Hybrid securities; Preferred stock; SBLF; Small Business Lending Fund; Trust preferred; TRUPS; TARP;

D O I：

10.1007/s11156-012-0327-7

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

This paper tests whether poorly capitalized banks with troubled loan books are more likely to miss their bailout dividends. Privately held banks with weaker core capital ratios, more charged off loans, more allowances for loan losses, and more non-performing loans are more likely to miss their Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) dividends. Banks that issue non-cumulative preferred stock are also more likely to be TARP deadbeats. In addition, banks that missed a bailout dividend in the prior quarter are significantly more likely to miss the next bailout dividend.

引用

页码：651 / 674

页数：24