CHARACTERIZING THE NASH AND RAIFFA BARGAINING SOLUTIONS BY DISAGREEMENT POINT AXIOMS

被引：37

作者：

PETERS, H ^{[1
]}

VANDAMME, E ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] TILBURG UNIV,CTR ECON RES,5000 LE TILBURG,NETHERLANDS

来源：

MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH | 1991年 / 16卷 / 03期

关键词：

GAMES; N-PERSON COOPERATIVE; NASH BARGAINING SOLUTIONS;

D O I：

10.1287/moor.16.3.447

中图分类号：

C93 [管理学]; O22 [运筹学];

学科分类号：

070105 ; 12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;

摘要：

We provide a new characterization of the n-person Nash bargaining solutions which does not involve Nash's Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom, but mainly uses axioms which concern changes in the disagreement point and leave the feasible set fixed. The main axiom requires a convex combination of a disagreement point and the corresponding solution point to give rise to that same solution point. Further, we describe how the disagreement point approach can be applied to other bargaining solution. The main result of the latter part is a first characterization of the so-called Continuous Raiffa solution.

引用

页码：447 / 461

页数：15

共 29 条

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[Anonymous], 1979, AXIOMATIC MODELS BAR

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