PLAYING THE TRANSPARENCY GAME - CONSULTATION AND POLICY-MAKING IN THE EUROPEAN-COMMISSION

被引:18
作者
PETERSON, J [1 ]
机构
[1] CTR EUROPEAN POLICY STUDIES,BRUSSELS,BELGIUM
关键词
D O I
10.1111/j.1467-9299.1995.tb00839.x
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
The recent unveiling of a package of measures designed to make the work of the European Commission more 'transparent' is part of a wider effort to make EU decisionmaking more open and accessible. Yet, the Commission's transparency package was designed above all to cope with its chronic management problems. These include rigid lines of division between different spheres of the Commission, the strong loyalties of policy-concerned Directorates-General (DGs) to their specific 'clientele', unclear rules governing access to information, and intense rivalries between DGs and the private offices of individual Commissioners. This article dissects the transparency package and uses case study material to highlight ways in which the transparency initiative seeks to provide antidotes to the Commission's management problems. It offers an early assessment of the transparency package's impact and examines the prospects for reform of the Commission under Jacques Santer.
引用
收藏
页码:473 / 492
页数:20
相关论文
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