INCENTIVES AND RISK SHARING IN SHARECOPPING

被引：547

作者：

STIGLITZ, JE ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] YALE UNIV,NEW HAVEN,CT 06521

来源：

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2296714

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：219 / 255

页数：37

共 15 条

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[7]

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[8]

Cheung S., 1969, THEORY SHARE TENANCY

[9]

Debreu G., 1959, THEORY VALUE AXIOMAT

[10]

Diamond PA, 1967, AM ECON REV, V57, P759