SELF-INTEREST AND RESPONSIVE REGULATION

被引:0
作者
HIGH, J
机构
关键词
D O I
10.1080/08913819308443294
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
To make regulation more responsive to the public interest, Ian Ayers and John Braithwaite recommend improved administrative techniques, such as enforcement pyramids, to improve industry compliance; and they advocate vesting public interest groups with regulatory powers, so as to reduce regulatory capture by industry. Their arguments, while suggestive, do not take seriously enough the subtle and multifarious influences of interest groups. Consequently, the authors' recommendations are not likely to improve regulation's responsiveness to the general welfare.
引用
收藏
页码:181 / 192
页数:12
相关论文
共 24 条
[1]  
Axelrod R., 1984, EVOLUTION COOPERATIO
[2]   PREDATION THROUGH REGULATION - THE WAGE AND PROFIT EFFECTS OF THE OCCUPATIONAL-SAFETY-AND-HEALTH-ADMINISTRATION AND THE ENVIRONMENTAL-PROTECTION-AGENCY [J].
BARTEL, AP ;
THOMAS, LG .
JOURNAL OF LAW & ECONOMICS, 1987, 30 (02) :239-264
[3]  
BATOR FM, 1958, Q J EC, V0072
[4]   A THEORY OF COMPETITION AMONG PRESSURE GROUPS FOR POLITICAL INFLUENCE [J].
BECKER, GS .
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, 1983, 98 (03) :371-400
[5]  
Benson Lee, 1955, MERCHANTS FARMERS RA
[6]  
Bernstein Marver H., 1955, REGULATING BUSINESS
[7]  
Buchanan J. M., 1962, CALCULUS CONSENT
[8]  
BUCHANAN JM, 1975, AM ECON REV, V65, P139
[9]  
Cowen T, 1988, THEORY MARKET FAILUR
[10]  
Crandall Robert W., 1983, CONTROLLING IND POLL