IDENTIFYING THE FREE RIDERS - A SIMPLE ALGORITHM FOR DETERMINING WHO WILL CONTRIBUTE TO A PUBLIC GOOD

被引:37
作者
ANDREONI, J
MCGUIRE, MC
机构
[1] UNIV CALIF IRVINE,DEPT ECON,IRVINE,CA 92717
[2] UNIV WISCONSIN,DEPT ECON,MADISON,WI 53706
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0047-2727(93)90076-6
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
When a heterogeneous group of people provide themselves with a pure public good the resulting Nash equilibrium outcome will divide the group into contributors and free riders. This paper proposes a general algorithm for discovering which individuals in the group fall into which of these two classes. The algorithm is based on identifying, for each individual, how much of the public good must be provided by others to drive that individual's contribution to zero.
引用
收藏
页码:447 / 454
页数:8
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