INCENTIVE COMPENSATION AND REIT FINANCIAL LEVERAGE AND ASSET RISK

被引：10
作者：
JENKINS, JW [1 ]
机构：
[1] BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIV,GRAD SCH MANAGEMENT,PROVO,UT 84602
来源：
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT | 1980年 / 9卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/3665317
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：81 / 87
页数：7
相关论文
共 50 条
[31]   The determinants of REIT CEO compensation [J].
Pennathur, AK ;
Shelor, RM .
JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE FINANCE AND ECONOMICS, 2002, 25 (01) :99-113
[32]   Labor Unemployment Risk and CEO Incentive Compensation [J].
Ellul, Andrew ;
Wang, Cong ;
Zhang, Kuo .
MANAGEMENT SCIENCE, 2024, 70 (02) :885-906
[33]   FLEXIBLE LABOR COMPENSATION, RISK SHARING AND COMPANY LEVERAGE [J].
ICHINO, A .
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1994, 38 (07) :1411-1421
[34]   Public Information, REIT Responses, Size, Leverage, and Focus [J].
Chatrath, Arjun ;
Christie-David, Rohan A. ;
Ramchander, Sanjay .
JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH, 2012, 34 (04) :463-513
[35]   The Determinants of REIT CEO Compensation [J].
Anita K. Pennathur ;
Roger M. Shelor .
The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, 2002, 25 :99-113
[36]   Interactive effects of financial leverage with asset-light strategies: The agency theory perspective [J].
Ji, Kate Mingjie ;
Wang, Juanxi ;
Boccardo, Luca ;
Brown, Howard ;
Wong, IpKin Anthony ;
Wu, Jiao .
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF HOSPITALITY MANAGEMENT, 2024, 116
[37]   AN EMPIRICAL-STUDY OF ASSET SIZE, FINANCIAL LEVERAGE, AND STOCK-MARKET ANOMALIES [J].
PHILLIPS, AL .
AKRON BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC REVIEW, 1989, 20 (03) :40-54
[38]   EXECUTIVE SHORT-TERM INCENTIVE, RISK-TAKING AND LEVERAGE-NEUTRAL INCENTIVE SCHEME [J].
Kaplanski, Guy ;
Levy, Haim .
ANNALS OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS, 2012, 7 (01)
[39]   Credit Risk, Cost of Capital and Excessive Financial Leverage [J].
Mejia Kambourova, David ;
Gomez Cardeno, Laura ;
Gutierrez Betancur, Juan Carlos .
ECOS DE ECONOMIA, 2019, 23 (49) :46-70
[40]   Size, leverage, and risk-taking of financial institutions [J].
Bhagat, Sanjai ;
Bolton, Brian ;
Lu, Jun .
JOURNAL OF BANKING & FINANCE, 2015, 59 :520-537
12345