USING CAPITAL MOBILITY TO ENFORCE COMMITMENT

被引：0

作者：

LEE, BK

机构：

[1] Division of Economics and Statistics, School of Accountancy and Business, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, 2263, Nanyang Avenue

来源：

ECONOMICS LETTERS | 1995年 / 47卷 / 02期

关键词：

CAPITAL MOBILITY; COMMITMENT;

D O I：

10.1016/0165-1765(94)00549-H

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

In this paper I show that capital mobility helps to enforce commitment in an environment where there is no commitment mechanism. This is done by comparing the set of sustainable outcomes a la Chari and Kehoe Journal of Political Economy, 1990, 98, 783-802, in an open economy to those in a closed economy. I show that the set in an open economy is always larger.

引用

页码：199 / 203

页数：5

共 6 条

[1] SUSTAINABLE PLANS [J].

CHARI, VV ;

KEHOE, PJ .

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1990, 98 (04) :783-802

[2] DYNAMIC INCONSISTENCY, COOPERATION AND THE BENEVOLENT DISSEMBLING GOVERNMENT [J].

FISCHER, S .

JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DYNAMICS & CONTROL, 1980, 2 (01) :93-107

[3]

GRUBEL HG, 1968, AM ECON REV, V58, P1299

[4] RULES RATHER THAN DISCRETION - INCONSISTENCY OF OPTIMAL PLANS [J].

KYDLAND, FE ;

PRESCOTT, EC .

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1977, 85 (03) :473-491

[5]

LEE BK, 1993, 2393 NAN TECHN U WOR

[6] THE TRAGEDY OF THE COMMONS AND ECONOMIC-GROWTH - WHY DOES CAPITAL FLOW FROM POOR TO RICH COUNTRIES [J].

TORNELL, A ;

VELASCO, A .

JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 1992, 100 (06) :1208-1231

← 1 →