CROSS-GAME LEARNING - EXPERIMENTAL-EVIDENCE FROM FIRST-PRICE AND ENGLISH COMMON VALUE AUCTIONS

被引:15
作者
KAGEL, JH
机构
[1] Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh
基金
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词
CROSS-GAME LEARNING; AUCTIONS;
D O I
10.1016/0165-1765(95)00658-3
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Experience in first-price auctions improves performance in English auctions, but experience in English auctions has no transfer value to first-price auctions. These results are discussed in terms of psychologists' models of learning generalizability and the learning literature in economics.
引用
收藏
页码:163 / 170
页数:8
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