Virtual moral agency, virtual moral responsibility: on the moral significance of the appearance, perception, and performance of artificial agents

被引：62

作者：

Coeckelbergh, Mark ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Twente, Dept Philosophy, POB 217, NL-7500 AE Enschede, Netherlands

来源：

AI & SOCIETY | 2009年 / 24卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1007/s00146-009-0208-3

中图分类号：

TP18 [人工智能理论];

学科分类号：

081104 ; 0812 ; 0835 ; 1405 ;

摘要：

[No abstract available]

引用

页码：181 / 189

页数：9

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