ARMS LENGTH RELATIONSHIPS

被引：195
作者：
CREMER, J
机构：
[1] CNRS, GREMAQ, IDEI
来源：
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1995年 / 110卷 / 02期
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/2118440
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We show that lowering the cost of acquisition of information that a principal obtains about the performance of an agent may make it more difficult for the principal to commit to threats. Hence it will weaken incentives and can therefore be counterproductive. This phenomenon is explored in a framework where improving the quality of information makes a commitment not to renegotiate less credible. Applications to the theory of the firm are briefly explored.
引用
收藏
页码：275 / 295
页数：21
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