INFORMATIONAL PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION AS A BARRIER TO ENTRY

被引：22
作者：
BAGWELL, K
机构：
[1] Northwestern University, Evanston
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 1990年 / 8卷 / 02期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/0167-7187(90)90016-T
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
In a market for experience goods, the products of an incumbent firm and a new entrant are informationally differentiated. A signalling model is analyzed, and it is shown that informational product differentiation can be a barrier to entry (even under 'pro-entry' assumptions). Furthermore, when products are informationally differentiated, cost-based notions of predation are argued inappropriate. © 1990.
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页码：207 / 223
页数：17
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