THE EVOLUTION OF INDIRECT RECIPROCITY

被引：217

作者：

BOYD, R ^{[1
]}

RICHERSON, PJ ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] UNIV CALIF DAVIS, INST ECOL, DAVIS, CA 95616 USA

来源：

SOCIAL NETWORKS | 1989年 / 11卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0378-8733(89)90003-8

中图分类号：

Q98 [人类学];

学科分类号：

030303 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：213 / 236

页数：24

共 33 条

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