THE EVOLUTION OF INDIRECT RECIPROCITY

[1] Alexander R. D., 1987, BIOL MORAL SYSTEMS

[2] A BIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF MORAL SYSTEMS [J]. ZYGON, 1985, 20 (01): : 3 - 20

[3] AOKI K, 1984, P NATIONAL ACADEMY S, V80, P4065

[4] THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION [J]. SCIENCE, 1981, 211 (4489) : 1390 - 1396

[5] EFFECTIVE CHOICE IN THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA [J]. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 1980, 24 (01) : 3 - 25

[6] Axelrod R., 1984, EVOLUTION COOPERATIO

[7] Boorman S.A., 1980, GENETICS ALTRUISM

[8] IS THE REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA A GOOD MODEL OF RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM [J]. ETHOLOGY AND SOCIOBIOLOGY, 1988, 9 (2-4): : 211 - 222

[9] MISTAKES ALLOW EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY IN THE REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAME [J]. JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY, 1989, 136 (01) : 47 - 56

[10] NO PURE STRATEGY IS EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE IN THE REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAME [J]. NATURE, 1987, 327 (6117) : 58 - 59

[1] Alexander R. D., 1987, BIOL MORAL SYSTEMS

[2] A BIOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF MORAL SYSTEMS [J]. ZYGON, 1985, 20 (01): : 3 - 20

[3] AOKI K, 1984, P NATIONAL ACADEMY S, V80, P4065

[4] THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION [J]. SCIENCE, 1981, 211 (4489) : 1390 - 1396

[5] EFFECTIVE CHOICE IN THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA [J]. JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, 1980, 24 (01) : 3 - 25

[6] Axelrod R., 1984, EVOLUTION COOPERATIO

[7] Boorman S.A., 1980, GENETICS ALTRUISM

[8] IS THE REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA A GOOD MODEL OF RECIPROCAL ALTRUISM [J]. ETHOLOGY AND SOCIOBIOLOGY, 1988, 9 (2-4): : 211 - 222

[9] MISTAKES ALLOW EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY IN THE REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAME [J]. JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL BIOLOGY, 1989, 136 (01) : 47 - 56

[10] NO PURE STRATEGY IS EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE IN THE REPEATED PRISONERS-DILEMMA GAME [J]. NATURE, 1987, 327 (6117) : 58 - 59