CONSCIOUSNESS(4) - VARIETIES OF INTRINSIC THEORY

A mental-occurrence instance is conscious4 if (and when) it is an object of inner (second-order) consciousness; that is, if a mental-occurrence instance occurs and is conscious4 on that occasion, one is conscious of it on the spot without having to take notice first of something else. In contrast, Freud's preconscious and unconscious psychical processes, whenever they occur, are examples of nonconscious4 mental-occurrence instances, which are not objects of inner (second-order) consciousness; that is, one has no consciousness of them unless one (a) takes notice of something else (e.g., a behavior, a bodily change, a conscious, mental-occurrence instance, or a brain-process recording) and (b) infers, therefrom, their occurrence. Determining how inner (second-order) consciousness transpires will soon have high priority on the scientific agendas of psychologists of consciousness. To assist in their forthcoming explanatory search, I present a straightforward survey of a number of intrinsic theories of consciousness4. Intrinsic theory holds that any conscious4 mental-occurrence instance has itself as (inner) object, plus whatever else it may give consciousness of; it is conscious 4 due to its own structure, not due to what happens next or later. Intrinsic theory differs from appendage theory and mental-eye theory, which both hold that a mental-occurrence instance cannot be consCious4 on its own, cannot give any consciousness of itself, only of something else at most.