IS TALK REALLY CHEAP - PROMPTING CONVERSATION BETWEEN CRITICAL-THEORY AND RATIONAL CHOICE

被引：80
作者：
JOHNSON, J
机构：
来源：
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW | 1993年 / 87卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/2938957
中图分类号：
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号：
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要：
Critical theory and rational choice theory share both overlapping concerns and parallel theoretical weaknesses. Specifically, both critical theorists and rational choice theorists are preoccupied with determining what rational can mean in the realm of social and political interaction. I show in a provisional way how game theory extends and deepens the critical theorists' basic intuition that unembellished strategic rationality cannot adequately sustain social and political interaction. And I suggest how critical theory identifies a mechanism underlying the force of the ''cheap talk'' that game theorists introduce in hopes of circumscribing the indeterminacy generated by their models. My goal is to stimulate productive conversation between what are typically considered discordant research traditions.
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页码：74 / 86
页数：13
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