WHERE TIMES MEET

This essay pursues two goals: (1) to argue that two fundamental types of time-the time of objective reality and "the time of the soul"-meet in human activity and history and (2) to defend the legitimacy of calling a particular version of the second type a kind of time. The essay begins by criticizing Paul Ricoeur's version of the claim that times of these two sorts meet in history. It then presents an account of human activity based on Heidegger's Being and Time, according to which certain times of the two types-existential temporality and succession- meet in human activity. The legitimacy of calling existential temporality a kind of time is then defended via an expanded analysis of activity that examines where the two times meet there. The concluding section briefly considers a conception of historical time due to David Carr before showing why history is a broader domain encompassing human activity where the two times meet.