Tax Compliance as an Evolutionary Coordination Game: An Agent-Based Approach

被引:37
|
作者
Bloomquist, Kim [1 ]
机构
[1] Internal Revenue Serv Off Res, Washington, DC USA
关键词
tax compliance; agent-based modeling; evolutionary game theory; laboratory experiments; random taxpayer audits;
D O I
10.1177/1091142110381640
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Tax reporting compliance by small business owners is modeled in an agent-based framework using concepts and methods based on evolutionary dynamics. A business owner's 'fitness" is a function of net after tax (and post-audit) income. Business owners exhibit heterogeneous tax morale and compliance propensity following four stochastically assigned behavioral "archetypes": Honest, Strategic, Defiant, and Random. The model is calibrated to observations from laboratory experiments and taxpayer random audits. The calibrated model is used to simulate evolutionary changes in a static population of 10,000 small business owners. A simulation using realistic parameters for the probability of audit and penalty rate finds that after fifteen time periods, the initial number of Honest business owners declines by approximately one-third and are displaced by proprietors having either Defiant or Strategic compliance behaviors.
引用
收藏
页码:25 / 49
页数:25
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