Tax Compliance as an Evolutionary Coordination Game: An Agent-Based Approach

被引:37
|
作者
Bloomquist, Kim [1 ]
机构
[1] Internal Revenue Serv Off Res, Washington, DC USA
关键词
tax compliance; agent-based modeling; evolutionary game theory; laboratory experiments; random taxpayer audits;
D O I
10.1177/1091142110381640
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
Tax reporting compliance by small business owners is modeled in an agent-based framework using concepts and methods based on evolutionary dynamics. A business owner's 'fitness" is a function of net after tax (and post-audit) income. Business owners exhibit heterogeneous tax morale and compliance propensity following four stochastically assigned behavioral "archetypes": Honest, Strategic, Defiant, and Random. The model is calibrated to observations from laboratory experiments and taxpayer random audits. The calibrated model is used to simulate evolutionary changes in a static population of 10,000 small business owners. A simulation using realistic parameters for the probability of audit and penalty rate finds that after fifteen time periods, the initial number of Honest business owners declines by approximately one-third and are displaced by proprietors having either Defiant or Strategic compliance behaviors.
引用
收藏
页码:25 / 49
页数:25
相关论文
共 50 条
  • [1] Tax Compliance and Public Goods Provision An Agent-based Econophysics Approach
    Hokamp, Sascha
    Seibold, Goetz
    CENTRAL EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC MODELLING AND ECONOMETRICS, 2014, 6 (04): : 217 - 236
  • [2] EXPLORING TAX COMPLIANCE: AN AGENT-BASED SIMULATION
    Miguel, Francisco J.
    Noguera, Jose A.
    Llacer, Toni
    Tapia, Eduardo
    PROCEEDINGS 26TH EUROPEAN CONFERENCE ON MODELLING AND SIMULATION ECMS 2012, 2012, : 638 - +
  • [3] Tax compliance as a coordination game
    Alm, J
    McKee, M
    JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR & ORGANIZATION, 2004, 54 (03) : 297 - 312
  • [4] An agent-based model of tax compliance with social networks
    Korobow, Adam
    Johnson, Chris
    Axtell, Robert
    NATIONAL TAX JOURNAL, 2007, 60 (03) : 589 - 610
  • [5] The use of agent-based modelling to investigate tax compliance
    Nigar Hashimzade
    Gareth D. Myles
    Frank Page
    Matthew D. Rablen
    Economics of Governance, 2015, 16 : 143 - 164
  • [6] The use of agent-based modelling to investigate tax compliance
    Hashimzade, Nigar
    Myles, Gareth D.
    Page, Frank
    Rablen, Matthew D.
    ECONOMICS OF GOVERNANCE, 2015, 16 (02) : 143 - 164
  • [7] The reasonable effectiveness of agent-based simulations in evolutionary game theory Reply to comments on "Evolutionary game theory using agent-based methods"
    Adami, Christoph
    Schossau, Jory
    Hintze, Arend
    PHYSICS OF LIFE REVIEWS, 2016, 19 : 38 - 42
  • [8] An agent-based approach to multisensor coordination
    Hodge, L
    Kamel, M
    IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SYSTEMS MAN AND CYBERNETICS PART A-SYSTEMS AND HUMANS, 2003, 33 (05): : 648 - 662
  • [9] Evolutionary game theory using agent-based methods
    Adami, Christoph
    Schossau, Jory
    Hintze, Arend
    PHYSICS OF LIFE REVIEWS, 2016, 19 : 1 - 26
  • [10] AN AGENT-BASED MODEL OF TAX COMPLIANCE: AN APPLICATION TO THE SPANISH CASE
    Llacer, Toni
    Miguel, Francisco J.
    Noguera, Jose A.
    Tapia, Eduardo
    ADVANCES IN COMPLEX SYSTEMS, 2013, 16 (4-5):