THINKING AND PHENOMENAL CONSCIOUSNESS

被引:1
作者
Jorba-Grau, Marta [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Barcelona, LOGOS Log Language & Cognit Res Grp, GEF, Barcelona, Spain
关键词
consciousness; phenomenality of thinking; dialogue; reductionism; anti-reductionism;
D O I
10.5840/bjp20113121
中图分类号
B [哲学、宗教];
学科分类号
01 ; 0101 ;
摘要
The topic of this paper concerns the relation between thinking and phenomenality as it is discussed in the Philosophy of Mind. Thus, I am addressing the following questions: does the domain of phenomenal consciousness include thinking? And if so, is the phenomenality of thinking (PT) proprietary or not? I will firstly present the debate and the main notions involved in it, by contrasting a certain mainstream picture of the mind with the one offered by Phenomenology. Second, I will consider the particular question of a proprietary phenomenology of conscious thought through the examination of the reductionist and antireductionist positions, concluding with a sceptical remark towards this dialectics.
引用
收藏
页码:101 / 110
页数:10
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